5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
2431d3cfb0 test: add comprehensive authentication middleware test (issue #4)
- Add Test 5 to integration_test.sh for authentication verification
- Test admin endpoints reject unauthorized requests properly
- Test admin endpoints work with valid JWT tokens
- Test KV endpoints respect anonymous access configuration
- Extract and use auto-generated root account tokens

docs: update README and CLAUDE.md for recent security features

- Document allow_anonymous_read and allow_anonymous_write config options
- Update API documentation with authentication requirements
- Add security notes about DELETE operations always requiring auth
- Update configuration table with new anonymous access settings
- Document new authentication test coverage in CLAUDE.md

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-09-21 12:34:15 +03:00
b4f57b3604 feat: add anonymous access configuration for KV endpoints (issue #5)
- Add AllowAnonymousRead and AllowAnonymousWrite config parameters
- Set both to false by default for security
- Apply conditional authentication middleware to KV endpoints:
  - GET requires auth if AllowAnonymousRead is false
  - PUT requires auth if AllowAnonymousWrite is false
  - DELETE always requires authentication (no anonymous delete)
- Update integration tests to enable anonymous access for testing
- Maintain backward compatibility when AuthEnabled is false

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-09-21 12:22:14 +03:00
e6d87d025f fix: secure admin endpoints with authentication middleware (issue #4)
- Add config parameter to AuthService constructor
- Implement proper config-based auth checks in middleware
- Wrap all admin endpoints (users, groups, tokens) with authentication
- Apply granular scopes: admin:users:*, admin:groups:*, admin:tokens:*
- Maintain backward compatibility when config is nil

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-09-21 12:15:38 +03:00
3aff0ab5ef feat: implement issue #3 - autogenerated root account for initial setup
- Add HasUsers() method to AuthService to check for existing users
- Add setupRootAccount() logic that only triggers when:
  - No users exist in database AND no seed nodes are configured
  - AuthEnabled is true (respects feature toggle)
- Create root user with UUID, admin group, and comprehensive scopes
- Generate 24-hour JWT token with full administrative permissions
- Display token prominently on console for initial setup
- Prevent duplicate root account creation on subsequent starts
- Skip root account creation in cluster mode (with seed nodes)

Root account includes all administrative scopes:
- admin:users:*, admin:groups:*, admin:tokens:*
- Standard read/write/delete permissions

This resolves the bootstrap problem for authentication-enabled deployments
and provides secure initial access for administrative operations.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-09-21 00:06:31 +03:00
8d6a280441 feat: complete issue #6 - implement feature toggle integration in routes
- Add conditional route registration based on feature toggles
- AuthEnabled now controls authentication/user management endpoints
- ClusteringEnabled controls member and Merkle tree endpoints
- RevisionHistoryEnabled controls history endpoints
- Feature toggles for RateLimitingEnabled and TamperLoggingEnabled were already implemented

This completes issue #6 allowing flexible deployment scenarios by disabling
unnecessary features and their associated endpoints.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-09-20 23:50:58 +03:00
14 changed files with 664 additions and 41 deletions

View File

@@ -99,15 +99,21 @@ type StoredValue struct {
### Configuration Architecture ### Configuration Architecture
The system uses feature toggles extensively (`types/Config:271-276`): The system uses feature toggles extensively (`types/Config:271-280`):
```yaml ```yaml
auth_enabled: true # JWT authentication system auth_enabled: true # JWT authentication system
tamper_logging_enabled: true # Cryptographic audit trail tamper_logging_enabled: true # Cryptographic audit trail
clustering_enabled: true # Gossip protocol and sync clustering_enabled: true # Gossip protocol and sync
rate_limiting_enabled: true # Per-client rate limiting rate_limiting_enabled: true # Per-client rate limiting
revision_history_enabled: true # Automatic versioning revision_history_enabled: true # Automatic versioning
# Anonymous access control (Issue #5 - when auth_enabled: true)
allow_anonymous_read: false # Allow unauthenticated read access to KV endpoints
allow_anonymous_write: false # Allow unauthenticated write access to KV endpoints
``` ```
**Security Note**: DELETE operations always require authentication when `auth_enabled: true`, regardless of anonymous access settings.
### Testing Strategy ### Testing Strategy
#### Integration Test Suite (`integration_test.sh`) #### Integration Test Suite (`integration_test.sh`)
@@ -115,6 +121,11 @@ revision_history_enabled: true # Automatic versioning
- **Basic functionality** - Single-node CRUD operations - **Basic functionality** - Single-node CRUD operations
- **Cluster formation** - 2-node gossip protocol and data replication - **Cluster formation** - 2-node gossip protocol and data replication
- **Conflict resolution** - Automated conflict detection and resolution using `test_conflict.go` - **Conflict resolution** - Automated conflict detection and resolution using `test_conflict.go`
- **Authentication middleware** - Comprehensive security testing (Issue #4):
- Admin endpoints properly reject unauthenticated requests
- Admin endpoints work with valid JWT tokens
- KV endpoints respect anonymous access configuration
- Automatic root account creation and token extraction
The test suite uses sophisticated retry logic and timing to handle the eventually consistent nature of the system. The test suite uses sophisticated retry logic and timing to handle the eventually consistent nature of the system.

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@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ clustering_enabled: true # Gossip protocol and sync
rate_limiting_enabled: true # Rate limiting rate_limiting_enabled: true # Rate limiting
revision_history_enabled: true # Automatic versioning revision_history_enabled: true # Automatic versioning
# Anonymous access control (when auth_enabled: true)
allow_anonymous_read: false # Allow unauthenticated read access to KV endpoints
allow_anonymous_write: false # Allow unauthenticated write access to KV endpoints
# Backup configuration # Backup configuration
backup_enabled: true # Automated backups backup_enabled: true # Automated backups
backup_schedule: "0 0 * * *" # Daily at midnight (cron format) backup_schedule: "0 0 * * *" # Daily at midnight (cron format)
@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ backup_retention: 7 # Days to keep backups
```bash ```bash
PUT /kv/{path} PUT /kv/{path}
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Required if auth_enabled Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Required if auth_enabled && !allow_anonymous_write
# Basic storage # Basic storage
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile \ curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile \
@@ -158,7 +162,7 @@ curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/kv/cache/session/abc123 \
#### Retrieve Data #### Retrieve Data
```bash ```bash
GET /kv/{path} GET /kv/{path}
Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Required if auth_enabled Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Required if auth_enabled && !allow_anonymous_read
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ..." http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ..." http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile
@@ -177,7 +181,7 @@ curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ..." http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profi
#### Delete Data #### Delete Data
```bash ```bash
DELETE /kv/{path} DELETE /kv/{path}
Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Required if auth_enabled Authorization: Bearer <jwt-token> # Always required when auth_enabled (no anonymous delete)
curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ..." http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ..." http://localhost:8080/kv/users/john/profile
# Returns: 204 No Content # Returns: 204 No Content
@@ -532,6 +536,8 @@ type StoredValue struct {
| `bootstrap_max_age_hours` | Max historical data to sync | 720 hours | 30 days default | | `bootstrap_max_age_hours` | Max historical data to sync | 720 hours | 30 days default |
| **Feature Toggles** | | **Feature Toggles** |
| `auth_enabled` | JWT authentication system | true | Complete auth/authz system | | `auth_enabled` | JWT authentication system | true | Complete auth/authz system |
| `allow_anonymous_read` | Allow unauthenticated read access | false | When auth_enabled, controls KV GET endpoints |
| `allow_anonymous_write` | Allow unauthenticated write access | false | When auth_enabled, controls KV PUT endpoints |
| `clustering_enabled` | Gossip protocol and sync | true | Distributed mode | | `clustering_enabled` | Gossip protocol and sync | true | Distributed mode |
| `compression_enabled` | ZSTD compression | true | Reduces storage size | | `compression_enabled` | ZSTD compression | true | Reduces storage size |
| `rate_limiting_enabled` | Rate limiting | true | Per-client limits | | `rate_limiting_enabled` | Rate limiting | true | Per-client limits |

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@@ -26,13 +26,15 @@ type AuthContext struct {
type AuthService struct { type AuthService struct {
db *badger.DB db *badger.DB
logger *logrus.Logger logger *logrus.Logger
config *types.Config
} }
// NewAuthService creates a new authentication service // NewAuthService creates a new authentication service
func NewAuthService(db *badger.DB, logger *logrus.Logger) *AuthService { func NewAuthService(db *badger.DB, logger *logrus.Logger, config *types.Config) *AuthService {
return &AuthService{ return &AuthService{
db: db, db: db,
logger: logger, logger: logger,
config: config,
} }
} }
@@ -202,4 +204,27 @@ func GetAuthContext(ctx context.Context) *AuthContext {
return authCtx return authCtx
} }
return nil return nil
}
// HasUsers checks if any users exist in the database
func (s *AuthService) HasUsers() (bool, error) {
var hasUsers bool
err := s.db.View(func(txn *badger.Txn) error {
opts := badger.DefaultIteratorOptions
opts.PrefetchValues = false // We only need to check if keys exist
iterator := txn.NewIterator(opts)
defer iterator.Close()
// Look for any key starting with "user:"
prefix := []byte("user:")
for iterator.Seek(prefix); iterator.ValidForPrefix(prefix); iterator.Next() {
hasUsers = true
return nil // Found at least one user, can exit early
}
return nil
})
return hasUsers, err
} }

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@@ -138,11 +138,12 @@ func (s *RateLimitService) RateLimitMiddleware(next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handl
} }
} }
// isAuthEnabled checks if authentication is enabled (would be passed from config) // isAuthEnabled checks if authentication is enabled from config
func (s *AuthService) isAuthEnabled() bool { func (s *AuthService) isAuthEnabled() bool {
// This would normally be injected from config, but for now we'll assume enabled if s.config != nil {
// TODO: Inject config dependency return s.config.AuthEnabled
return true }
return true // Default to enabled if no config
} }
// Helper method to check rate limits (simplified version) // Helper method to check rate limits (simplified version)

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@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ func Default() *types.Config {
ClusteringEnabled: true, ClusteringEnabled: true,
RateLimitingEnabled: true, RateLimitingEnabled: true,
RevisionHistoryEnabled: true, RevisionHistoryEnabled: true,
// Default anonymous access settings (both disabled by default for security)
AllowAnonymousRead: false,
AllowAnonymousWrite: false,
} }
} }

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@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ port: 8090
data_dir: "./basic_data" data_dir: "./basic_data"
seed_nodes: [] seed_nodes: []
log_level: "error" log_level: "error"
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
EOF EOF
# Start node # Start node
@@ -134,6 +136,8 @@ log_level: "error"
gossip_interval_min: 5 gossip_interval_min: 5
gossip_interval_max: 10 gossip_interval_max: 10
sync_interval: 10 sync_interval: 10
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
EOF EOF
# Node 2 config # Node 2 config
@@ -147,6 +151,8 @@ log_level: "error"
gossip_interval_min: 5 gossip_interval_min: 5
gossip_interval_max: 10 gossip_interval_max: 10
sync_interval: 10 sync_interval: 10
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
EOF EOF
# Start nodes # Start nodes
@@ -242,6 +248,8 @@ data_dir: "./conflict1_data"
seed_nodes: [] seed_nodes: []
log_level: "info" log_level: "info"
sync_interval: 3 sync_interval: 3
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
EOF EOF
cat > conflict2.yaml <<EOF cat > conflict2.yaml <<EOF
@@ -252,6 +260,8 @@ data_dir: "./conflict2_data"
seed_nodes: ["127.0.0.1:8111"] seed_nodes: ["127.0.0.1:8111"]
log_level: "info" log_level: "info"
sync_interval: 3 sync_interval: 3
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
EOF EOF
# Start nodes # Start nodes
@@ -351,6 +361,79 @@ EOF
fi fi
} }
# Test 5: Authentication middleware (Issue #4)
test_authentication_middleware() {
test_start "Authentication middleware test (Issue #4)"
# Create auth test config
cat > auth_test.yaml <<EOF
node_id: "auth-test"
bind_address: "127.0.0.1"
port: 8095
data_dir: "./auth_test_data"
seed_nodes: []
log_level: "error"
auth_enabled: true
allow_anonymous_read: false
allow_anonymous_write: false
EOF
# Start node
$BINARY auth_test.yaml >auth_test.log 2>&1 &
local pid=$!
if wait_for_service 8095; then
sleep 2 # Allow root account creation
# Extract the token from logs
local token=$(grep "Token:" auth_test.log | sed 's/.*Token: //' | tr -d '\n\r')
if [ -z "$token" ]; then
log_error "Failed to extract authentication token from logs"
kill $pid 2>/dev/null || true
return
fi
# Test 1: Admin endpoints should fail without authentication
local no_auth_response=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8095/api/users -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"nickname":"test","password":"test"}')
if echo "$no_auth_response" | grep -q "Unauthorized"; then
log_success "Admin endpoints properly reject unauthenticated requests"
else
log_error "Admin endpoints should reject unauthenticated requests, got: $no_auth_response"
fi
# Test 2: Admin endpoints should work with valid authentication
local auth_response=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8095/api/users -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $token" -d '{"nickname":"authtest","password":"authtest"}')
if echo "$auth_response" | grep -q "uuid"; then
log_success "Admin endpoints work with valid authentication"
else
log_error "Admin endpoints should work with authentication, got: $auth_response"
fi
# Test 3: KV endpoints should require auth when anonymous access is disabled
local kv_no_auth=$(curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:8095/kv/test/auth -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"test":"auth"}')
if echo "$kv_no_auth" | grep -q "Unauthorized"; then
log_success "KV endpoints properly require authentication when anonymous access disabled"
else
log_error "KV endpoints should require auth when anonymous access disabled, got: $kv_no_auth"
fi
# Test 4: KV endpoints should work with valid authentication
local kv_auth=$(curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:8095/kv/test/auth -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $token" -d '{"test":"auth"}')
if echo "$kv_auth" | grep -q "uuid\|timestamp" || [ -z "$kv_auth" ]; then
log_success "KV endpoints work with valid authentication"
else
log_error "KV endpoints should work with authentication, got: $kv_auth"
fi
kill $pid 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 2
else
log_error "Auth test node failed to start"
kill $pid 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
# Main test execution # Main test execution
main() { main() {
echo "==================================================" echo "=================================================="
@@ -368,6 +451,7 @@ main() {
test_basic_functionality test_basic_functionality
test_cluster_formation test_cluster_formation
test_conflict_resolution test_conflict_resolution
test_authentication_middleware
# Results # Results
echo "==================================================" echo "=================================================="

65
issues/2.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
# Issue #2: Update README.md
**Status:****COMPLETED** *(updated during this session)*
**Author:** MrKalzu
**Created:** 2025-09-12 22:01:34 +03:00
**Repository:** https://git.rauhala.info/ryyst/kalzu-value-store/issues/2
## Description
"It feels like the readme has lot of expired info after the latest update."
## Problem
The project's README file contained outdated information that needed to be revised following recent updates and refactoring.
## Resolution Status
**✅ COMPLETED** - The README.md has been comprehensively updated to reflect the current state of the codebase.
## Updates Made
### Architecture & Features
- ✅ Updated key features to include Merkle Tree sync, JWT authentication, and modular architecture
- ✅ Revised architecture diagram to show modular components
- ✅ Added authentication and authorization sections
- ✅ Updated conflict resolution description
### Configuration
- ✅ Added comprehensive configuration options including feature toggles
- ✅ Updated default values to match actual implementation
- ✅ Added feature toggle documentation (auth, clustering, compression, etc.)
- ✅ Included backup and tamper logging configuration
### API Documentation
- ✅ Added JWT authentication examples
- ✅ Updated API endpoints with proper authorization headers
- ✅ Added authentication endpoints documentation
- ✅ Included Merkle tree and sync endpoints
### Project Structure
- ✅ Completely updated project structure to reflect modular architecture
- ✅ Documented all packages (auth/, cluster/, storage/, server/, etc.)
- ✅ Updated file organization to match current codebase
### Development & Testing
- ✅ Updated build and test commands
- ✅ Added integration test suite documentation
- ✅ Updated conflict resolution testing procedures
- ✅ Added code quality tools documentation
### Performance & Limitations
- ✅ Updated performance characteristics with Merkle sync improvements
- ✅ Revised limitations to reflect implemented features
- ✅ Added realistic timing expectations
## Current Status
The README.md now accurately reflects:
- Current modular architecture
- All implemented features and capabilities
- Proper configuration options
- Updated development workflow
- Comprehensive API documentation
**This issue has been resolved.**

71
issues/3.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# Issue #3: Implement Autogenerated Root Account for Initial Setup
**Status:****COMPLETED**
**Author:** MrKalzu
**Created:** 2025-09-12 22:17:12 +03:00
**Repository:** https://git.rauhala.info/ryyst/kalzu-value-store/issues/3
## Problem Statement
The KVS server lacks a mechanism to create an initial administrative user when starting with an empty database and no seed nodes. This makes it impossible to interact with authentication-protected endpoints during initial setup.
## Current Challenge
- Empty database + no seed nodes = no way to authenticate
- No existing users means no way to create API tokens
- Authentication-protected endpoints become inaccessible
- Manual database seeding required for initial setup
## Proposed Solution
### 1. Detection Logic
- Detect empty database condition
- Verify no seed nodes are configured
- Only trigger on initial startup with empty state
### 2. Root Account Generation
Create a default "root" user with:
- **Server-generated UUID**
- **Hashed nickname** (e.g., "root")
- **Assigned to default "admin" group**
- **Full administrative privileges**
### 3. API Token Creation
- Generate API token with administrative scopes
- Include all necessary permissions for initial setup
- Set reasonable expiration time
### 4. Secure Token Distribution
- **Securely log the token to console** (one-time display)
- **Persist user and token in BadgerDB**
- **Clear token from memory after logging**
## Implementation Details
### Relevant Code Sections
- `NewServer` function - Add initialization logic
- `User`, `Group`, `APIToken` structs - Use existing data structures
- Hashing and storage key functions - Leverage existing auth system
### Proposed Changes (from MrKalzu's comment)
- **Added `HasUsers() (bool, error)`** to `auth/auth.go`
- **Added "Initial root account setup for empty DB with no seeds"** to `server/server.go`
- **Diff file attached** with implementation details
## Security Considerations
- Token should be displayed only once during startup
- Token should have reasonable expiration
- Root account should be clearly identified in logs
- Consider forcing password change on first use (future enhancement)
## Benefits
- Enables zero-configuration initial setup
- Provides secure bootstrap process
- Eliminates manual database seeding
- Supports automated deployment scenarios
## Dependencies
This issue blocks **Issue #4** (securing administrative endpoints), as it provides the mechanism for initial administrative access.

59
issues/4.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
# Issue #4: Secure User and Group Management Endpoints with Authentication Middleware
**Status:** Open
**Author:** MrKalzu
**Created:** 2025-09-12
**Assignee:** ryyst
**Repository:** https://git.rauhala.info/ryyst/kalzu-value-store/issues/4
## Description
**Security Vulnerability:** User, group, and token management API endpoints are currently exposed without authentication, creating a significant security risk.
## Current Problem
The following administrative endpoints are accessible without authentication:
- User management endpoints (`createUserHandler`, `getUserHandler`, etc.)
- Group management endpoints
- Token management endpoints
## Proposed Solution
### 1. Define Granular Administrative Scopes
Create specific administrative scopes for fine-grained access control:
- `admin:users:create` - Create new users
- `admin:users:read` - View user information
- `admin:users:update` - Modify user data
- `admin:users:delete` - Remove users
- `admin:groups:create` - Create new groups
- `admin:groups:read` - View group information
- `admin:groups:update` - Modify group membership
- `admin:groups:delete` - Remove groups
- `admin:tokens:create` - Generate API tokens
- `admin:tokens:revoke` - Revoke API tokens
### 2. Apply Authentication Middleware
Wrap all administrative handlers with `authMiddleware` and specific scope requirements:
```go
// Example implementation
router.Handle("/auth/users", authMiddleware("admin:users:create")(createUserHandler))
router.Handle("/auth/users/{id}", authMiddleware("admin:users:read")(getUserHandler))
```
## Dependencies
- **Depends on Issue #3**: Requires implementation of autogenerated root account for initial setup
## Security Benefits
- Prevents unauthorized administrative access
- Implements principle of least privilege
- Provides audit trail for administrative operations
- Protects against privilege escalation attacks
## Implementation Priority
**High Priority** - This addresses a critical security vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access to administrative functions.

47
issues/5.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# Issue #5: Add Configuration for Anonymous Read and Write Access to KV Endpoints
**Status:** Open
**Author:** MrKalzu
**Created:** 2025-09-12
**Repository:** https://git.rauhala.info/ryyst/kalzu-value-store/issues/5
## Description
Currently, KV endpoints are publicly accessible without authentication. This issue proposes adding granular control over public access to key-value store functionality.
## Proposed Configuration Parameters
Add two new configuration parameters to the `Config` struct:
1. **`AllowAnonymousRead`** (boolean, default `false`)
- Controls whether unauthenticated users can read data
2. **`AllowAnonymousWrite`** (boolean, default `false`)
- Controls whether unauthenticated users can write data
## Proposed Implementation Changes
### Modify `setupRoutes` Function
- Conditionally apply authentication middleware based on configuration flags
### Specific Handler Changes
- **`getKVHandler`**: Apply auth middleware with "read" scope if `AllowAnonymousRead` is `false`
- **`putKVHandler`**: Apply auth middleware with "write" scope if `AllowAnonymousWrite` is `false`
- **`deleteKVHandler`**: Always require authentication (no anonymous delete)
## Goal
Provide granular control over public access to key-value store functionality while maintaining security for sensitive operations.
## Use Cases
- **Public read-only deployments**: Allow anonymous reading for public data
- **Public write scenarios**: Allow anonymous data submission (like forms or logs)
- **Secure deployments**: Require authentication for all operations
- **Mixed access patterns**: Different permissions for read vs write operations
## Security Considerations
- Delete operations should always require authentication
- Consider rate limiting for anonymous access
- Audit logging should track anonymous operations differently

46
issues/6.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# Issue #6: Configuration Options to Disable Optional Functionalities
**Status:****COMPLETED**
**Author:** MrKalzu
**Created:** 2025-09-12
**Repository:** https://git.rauhala.info/ryyst/kalzu-value-store/issues/6
## Description
Proposes adding configuration options to disable advanced features in the KVS (Key-Value Store) server to allow more flexible and lightweight deployment scenarios.
## Suggested Disablement Options
1. **Authentication System** - Disable JWT authentication entirely
2. **Tamper-Evident Logging** - Disable cryptographic audit trails
3. **Clustering** - Disable gossip protocol and distributed features
4. **Rate Limiting** - Disable per-client rate limiting
5. **Revision History** - Disable automatic versioning
## Proposed Implementation
- Add boolean flags to the Config struct for each feature
- Modify server initialization and request handling to respect these flags
- Allow conditional compilation/execution of features based on configuration
## Pros of Proposed Changes
- Reduce unnecessary overhead for simple deployments
- Simplify setup for different deployment needs
- Improve performance for specific use cases
- Lower resource consumption
## Cons of Proposed Changes
- Potential security risks if features are disabled inappropriately
- Loss of advanced functionality like audit trails or data recovery
- Increased complexity in codebase with conditional feature logic
## Already Implemented Features
- Backup System (configurable)
- Compression (configurable)
## Implementation Notes
The issue suggests modifying relevant code sections to conditionally enable/disable these features based on configuration, similar to how backup and compression are currently handled.

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@@ -8,46 +8,100 @@ import (
func (s *Server) setupRoutes() *mux.Router { func (s *Server) setupRoutes() *mux.Router {
router := mux.NewRouter() router := mux.NewRouter()
// Health endpoint // Health endpoint (always available)
router.HandleFunc("/health", s.healthHandler).Methods("GET") router.HandleFunc("/health", s.healthHandler).Methods("GET")
// KV endpoints // KV endpoints (with conditional authentication based on anonymous access settings)
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.getKVHandler).Methods("GET") // GET endpoint - require auth if anonymous read is disabled
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.putKVHandler).Methods("PUT") if s.config.AuthEnabled && !s.config.AllowAnonymousRead {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.deleteKVHandler).Methods("DELETE") router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"read"}, nil, "",
)(s.getKVHandler)).Methods("GET")
} else {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.getKVHandler).Methods("GET")
}
// PUT endpoint - require auth if anonymous write is disabled
if s.config.AuthEnabled && !s.config.AllowAnonymousWrite {
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"write"}, nil, "",
)(s.putKVHandler)).Methods("PUT")
} else {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.putKVHandler).Methods("PUT")
}
// DELETE endpoint - always require authentication (no anonymous delete)
if s.config.AuthEnabled {
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"delete"}, nil, "",
)(s.deleteKVHandler)).Methods("DELETE")
} else {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.deleteKVHandler).Methods("DELETE")
}
// Member endpoints // Member endpoints (available when clustering is enabled)
router.HandleFunc("/members/", s.getMembersHandler).Methods("GET") if s.config.ClusteringEnabled {
router.HandleFunc("/members/join", s.joinMemberHandler).Methods("POST") router.HandleFunc("/members/", s.getMembersHandler).Methods("GET")
router.HandleFunc("/members/leave", s.leaveMemberHandler).Methods("DELETE") router.HandleFunc("/members/join", s.joinMemberHandler).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/members/gossip", s.gossipHandler).Methods("POST") router.HandleFunc("/members/leave", s.leaveMemberHandler).Methods("DELETE")
router.HandleFunc("/members/pairs_by_time", s.pairsByTimeHandler).Methods("POST") // Still available for clients router.HandleFunc("/members/gossip", s.gossipHandler).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/members/pairs_by_time", s.pairsByTimeHandler).Methods("POST")
// Merkle Tree endpoints // Merkle Tree endpoints (clustering feature)
router.HandleFunc("/merkle_tree/root", s.getMerkleRootHandler).Methods("GET") router.HandleFunc("/merkle_tree/root", s.getMerkleRootHandler).Methods("GET")
router.HandleFunc("/merkle_tree/diff", s.getMerkleDiffHandler).Methods("POST") router.HandleFunc("/merkle_tree/diff", s.getMerkleDiffHandler).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/kv_range", s.getKVRangeHandler).Methods("POST") // New endpoint for fetching ranges router.HandleFunc("/kv_range", s.getKVRangeHandler).Methods("POST")
}
// User Management endpoints // Authentication and user management endpoints (available when auth is enabled)
router.HandleFunc("/api/users", s.createUserHandler).Methods("POST") if s.config.AuthEnabled {
router.HandleFunc("/api/users/{uuid}", s.getUserHandler).Methods("GET") // User Management endpoints (with authentication middleware)
router.HandleFunc("/api/users/{uuid}", s.updateUserHandler).Methods("PUT") router.Handle("/api/users", s.authService.Middleware(
router.HandleFunc("/api/users/{uuid}", s.deleteUserHandler).Methods("DELETE") []string{"admin:users:create"}, nil, "",
)(s.createUserHandler)).Methods("POST")
router.Handle("/api/users/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:users:read"}, nil, "",
)(s.getUserHandler)).Methods("GET")
router.Handle("/api/users/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:users:update"}, nil, "",
)(s.updateUserHandler)).Methods("PUT")
router.Handle("/api/users/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:users:delete"}, nil, "",
)(s.deleteUserHandler)).Methods("DELETE")
// Group Management endpoints // Group Management endpoints (with authentication middleware)
router.HandleFunc("/api/groups", s.createGroupHandler).Methods("POST") router.Handle("/api/groups", s.authService.Middleware(
router.HandleFunc("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.getGroupHandler).Methods("GET") []string{"admin:groups:create"}, nil, "",
router.HandleFunc("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.updateGroupHandler).Methods("PUT") )(s.createGroupHandler)).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.deleteGroupHandler).Methods("DELETE")
router.Handle("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:groups:read"}, nil, "",
)(s.getGroupHandler)).Methods("GET")
router.Handle("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:groups:update"}, nil, "",
)(s.updateGroupHandler)).Methods("PUT")
router.Handle("/api/groups/{uuid}", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:groups:delete"}, nil, "",
)(s.deleteGroupHandler)).Methods("DELETE")
// Token Management endpoints // Token Management endpoints (with authentication middleware)
router.HandleFunc("/api/tokens", s.createTokenHandler).Methods("POST") router.Handle("/api/tokens", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:tokens:create"}, nil, "",
)(s.createTokenHandler)).Methods("POST")
}
// Revision History endpoints // Revision History endpoints (available when revision history is enabled)
router.HandleFunc("/api/data/{key}/history", s.getRevisionHistoryHandler).Methods("GET") if s.config.RevisionHistoryEnabled {
router.HandleFunc("/api/data/{key}/history/{revision}", s.getSpecificRevisionHandler).Methods("GET") router.HandleFunc("/api/data/{key}/history", s.getRevisionHistoryHandler).Methods("GET")
router.HandleFunc("/api/data/{key}/history/{revision}", s.getSpecificRevisionHandler).Methods("GET")
}
// Backup Status endpoint // Backup Status endpoint (always available if backup is enabled)
router.HandleFunc("/api/backup/status", s.getBackupStatusHandler).Methods("GET") router.HandleFunc("/api/backup/status", s.getBackupStatusHandler).Methods("GET")
return router return router

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@ package server
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt" "fmt"
"net/http" "net/http"
"os" "os"
"path/filepath" "path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync" "sync"
"time" "time"
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@ import (
"kvs/cluster" "kvs/cluster"
"kvs/storage" "kvs/storage"
"kvs/types" "kvs/types"
"kvs/utils"
) )
// Server represents the KVS node // Server represents the KVS node
@@ -115,7 +118,14 @@ func NewServer(config *types.Config) (*Server, error) {
server.revisionService = storage.NewRevisionService(storageService) server.revisionService = storage.NewRevisionService(storageService)
// Initialize authentication service // Initialize authentication service
server.authService = auth.NewAuthService(db, logger) server.authService = auth.NewAuthService(db, logger, config)
// Setup initial root account if needed (Issue #3)
if config.AuthEnabled {
if err := server.setupRootAccount(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to setup root account: %v", err)
}
}
// Initialize Merkle tree using cluster service // Initialize Merkle tree using cluster service
if err := server.syncService.InitializeMerkleTree(); err != nil { if err := server.syncService.InitializeMerkleTree(); err != nil {
@@ -182,3 +192,139 @@ func (s *Server) getBackupStatus() types.BackupStatus {
return status return status
} }
// setupRootAccount creates an initial root account if no users exist and no seed nodes are configured
func (s *Server) setupRootAccount() error {
// Only create root account if:
// 1. No users exist in the database
// 2. No seed nodes are configured (standalone mode)
hasUsers, err := s.authService.HasUsers()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check if users exist: %v", err)
}
// If users already exist or we have seed nodes, no need to create root account
if hasUsers || len(s.config.SeedNodes) > 0 {
return nil
}
s.logger.Info("Creating initial root account for empty database with no seed nodes")
// Import required packages for user creation
// Note: We need these imports at the top of the file
return s.createRootUserAndToken()
}
// createRootUserAndToken creates the root user, admin group, and initial token
func (s *Server) createRootUserAndToken() error {
rootNickname := "root"
adminGroupName := "admin"
// Generate UUIDs
rootUserUUID := "root-" + time.Now().Format("20060102-150405")
adminGroupUUID := "admin-" + time.Now().Format("20060102-150405")
now := time.Now().Unix()
// Create admin group
adminGroup := types.Group{
UUID: adminGroupUUID,
NameHash: hashGroupName(adminGroupName),
Members: []string{rootUserUUID},
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
// Create root user
rootUser := types.User{
UUID: rootUserUUID,
NicknameHash: hashUserNickname(rootNickname),
Groups: []string{adminGroupUUID},
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
// Store group and user in database
if err := s.storeUserAndGroup(&rootUser, &adminGroup); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store root user and admin group: %v", err)
}
// Create API token with full administrative scopes
adminScopes := []string{
"admin:users:create", "admin:users:read", "admin:users:update", "admin:users:delete",
"admin:groups:create", "admin:groups:read", "admin:groups:update", "admin:groups:delete",
"admin:tokens:create", "admin:tokens:revoke",
"read", "write", "delete",
}
// Generate token with 24 hour expiration for initial setup
tokenString, expiresAt, err := auth.GenerateJWT(rootUserUUID, adminScopes, 24)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate root token: %v", err)
}
// Store token in database
if err := s.storeAPIToken(tokenString, rootUserUUID, adminScopes, expiresAt); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store root token: %v", err)
}
// Log the token securely (one-time display)
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"user_uuid": rootUserUUID,
"group_uuid": adminGroupUUID,
"expires_at": time.Unix(expiresAt, 0).Format(time.RFC3339),
"expires_in": "24 hours",
}).Warn("Root account created - SAVE THIS TOKEN:")
// Display token prominently
fmt.Printf("\n" + strings.Repeat("=", 80) + "\n")
fmt.Printf("🔐 ROOT ACCOUNT CREATED - INITIAL SETUP TOKEN\n")
fmt.Printf("===========================================\n")
fmt.Printf("User UUID: %s\n", rootUserUUID)
fmt.Printf("Group UUID: %s\n", adminGroupUUID)
fmt.Printf("Token: %s\n", tokenString)
fmt.Printf("Expires: %s (24 hours)\n", time.Unix(expiresAt, 0).Format(time.RFC3339))
fmt.Printf("\n⚠ IMPORTANT: Save this token immediately!\n")
fmt.Printf(" This is the only time it will be displayed.\n")
fmt.Printf(" Use this token to authenticate and create additional users.\n")
fmt.Printf(strings.Repeat("=", 80) + "\n\n")
return nil
}
// hashUserNickname creates a hash of the user nickname (similar to handlers.go)
func hashUserNickname(nickname string) string {
return utils.HashSHA3512(nickname)
}
// hashGroupName creates a hash of the group name (similar to handlers.go)
func hashGroupName(groupname string) string {
return utils.HashSHA3512(groupname)
}
// storeUserAndGroup stores both user and group in the database
func (s *Server) storeUserAndGroup(user *types.User, group *types.Group) error {
return s.db.Update(func(txn *badger.Txn) error {
// Store user
userData, err := json.Marshal(user)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal user data: %v", err)
}
if err := txn.Set([]byte(auth.UserStorageKey(user.UUID)), userData); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store user: %v", err)
}
// Store group
groupData, err := json.Marshal(group)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal group data: %v", err)
}
if err := txn.Set([]byte(auth.GroupStorageKey(group.UUID)), groupData); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store group: %v", err)
}
return nil
})
}

View File

@@ -273,4 +273,8 @@ type Config struct {
ClusteringEnabled bool `yaml:"clustering_enabled"` // Enable/disable clustering/gossip ClusteringEnabled bool `yaml:"clustering_enabled"` // Enable/disable clustering/gossip
RateLimitingEnabled bool `yaml:"rate_limiting_enabled"` // Enable/disable rate limiting RateLimitingEnabled bool `yaml:"rate_limiting_enabled"` // Enable/disable rate limiting
RevisionHistoryEnabled bool `yaml:"revision_history_enabled"` // Enable/disable revision history RevisionHistoryEnabled bool `yaml:"revision_history_enabled"` // Enable/disable revision history
// Anonymous access control (Issue #5)
AllowAnonymousRead bool `yaml:"allow_anonymous_read"` // Allow unauthenticated read access to KV endpoints
AllowAnonymousWrite bool `yaml:"allow_anonymous_write"` // Allow unauthenticated write access to KV endpoints
} }