2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
852275945c fix: update bootstrap service and routes for cluster authentication
- Updated bootstrap service to use authenticated HTTP client with cluster auth headers
- Made GET /members/ endpoint unprotected for monitoring/inspection purposes
- All other cluster communication endpoints remain protected by cluster auth middleware

This ensures proper cluster formation while maintaining security for inter-node communication.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-02 22:27:15 +03:00
c7dcebb894 feat: implement secure cluster authentication (issue #13)
Implemented a comprehensive secure authentication mechanism for inter-node
cluster communication with the following features:

1. Global Cluster Secret (GCS)
   - Auto-generated cryptographically secure random secret (256-bit)
   - Configurable via YAML config file
   - Shared across all cluster nodes for authentication

2. Cluster Authentication Middleware
   - Validates X-Cluster-Secret and X-Node-ID headers
   - Applied to all cluster endpoints (/members/*, /merkle_tree/*, /kv_range)
   - Comprehensive logging of authentication attempts

3. Authenticated HTTP Client
   - Custom HTTP client with cluster auth headers
   - TLS support with configurable certificate verification
   - Protocol-aware (http/https based on TLS settings)

4. Secure Bootstrap Endpoint
   - New /auth/cluster-bootstrap endpoint
   - Protected by JWT authentication with admin scope
   - Allows new nodes to securely obtain cluster secret

5. Updated Cluster Communication
   - All gossip protocol requests include auth headers
   - All Merkle tree sync requests include auth headers
   - All data replication requests include auth headers

6. Configuration
   - cluster_secret: Shared secret (auto-generated if not provided)
   - cluster_tls_enabled: Enable TLS for inter-node communication
   - cluster_tls_cert_file: Path to TLS certificate
   - cluster_tls_key_file: Path to TLS private key
   - cluster_tls_skip_verify: Skip TLS verification (testing only)

This implementation addresses the security vulnerability of unprotected
cluster endpoints and provides a flexible, secure approach to protecting
internal cluster communication while allowing for automated node bootstrapping.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-02 22:19:40 +03:00
30 changed files with 533 additions and 923 deletions

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@@ -228,43 +228,3 @@ func (s *AuthService) HasUsers() (bool, error) {
return hasUsers, err
}
// StoreResourceMetadata stores or updates resource metadata in BadgerDB
func (s *AuthService) StoreResourceMetadata(path string, metadata *types.ResourceMetadata) error {
now := time.Now().Unix()
if metadata.CreatedAt == 0 {
metadata.CreatedAt = now
}
metadata.UpdatedAt = now
metadataData, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return s.db.Update(func(txn *badger.Txn) error {
return txn.Set([]byte(ResourceMetadataKey(path)), metadataData)
})
}
// GetResourceMetadata retrieves resource metadata from BadgerDB
func (s *AuthService) GetResourceMetadata(path string) (*types.ResourceMetadata, error) {
var metadata types.ResourceMetadata
err := s.db.View(func(txn *badger.Txn) error {
item, err := txn.Get([]byte(ResourceMetadataKey(path)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
return item.Value(func(val []byte) error {
return json.Unmarshal(val, &metadata)
})
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &metadata, nil
}

77
auth/cluster.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
package auth
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// ClusterAuthService handles authentication for inter-cluster communication
type ClusterAuthService struct {
clusterSecret string
logger *logrus.Logger
}
// NewClusterAuthService creates a new cluster authentication service
func NewClusterAuthService(clusterSecret string, logger *logrus.Logger) *ClusterAuthService {
return &ClusterAuthService{
clusterSecret: clusterSecret,
logger: logger,
}
}
// Middleware validates cluster authentication headers
func (s *ClusterAuthService) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Extract authentication headers
clusterSecret := r.Header.Get("X-Cluster-Secret")
nodeID := r.Header.Get("X-Node-ID")
// Log authentication attempt
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"node_id": nodeID,
"remote_addr": r.RemoteAddr,
"path": r.URL.Path,
"method": r.Method,
}).Debug("Cluster authentication attempt")
// Validate cluster secret
if clusterSecret == "" {
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"node_id": nodeID,
"remote_addr": r.RemoteAddr,
"path": r.URL.Path,
}).Warn("Missing X-Cluster-Secret header")
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: Missing cluster secret", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if clusterSecret != s.clusterSecret {
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"node_id": nodeID,
"remote_addr": r.RemoteAddr,
"path": r.URL.Path,
}).Warn("Invalid cluster secret")
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: Invalid cluster secret", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Validate node ID is present
if nodeID == "" {
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"remote_addr": r.RemoteAddr,
"path": r.URL.Path,
}).Warn("Missing X-Node-ID header")
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: Missing node ID", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Authentication successful
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"node_id": nodeID,
"path": r.URL.Path,
}).Debug("Cluster authentication successful")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}

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@@ -82,10 +82,19 @@ func (s *BootstrapService) attemptJoin(seedAddr string) bool {
return false
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/members/join", seedAddr)
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 10*time.Second)
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/members/join", protocol, seedAddr)
resp, err := client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).Error("Failed to create join request")
return false
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"seed": seedAddr,

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@@ -181,11 +181,20 @@ func (s *GossipService) gossipWithPeer(peer *types.Member) error {
return err
}
// Send HTTP request to peer
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/members/gossip", peer.Address)
// Send HTTP request to peer with cluster authentication
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 5*time.Second)
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/members/gossip", protocol, peer.Address)
resp, err := client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).Error("Failed to create gossip request")
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"peer": peer.Address,

43
cluster/http_client.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
package cluster
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"time"
"kvs/types"
)
// NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient creates an HTTP client configured for cluster authentication
func NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(config *types.Config, timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
}
// Configure TLS if enabled
if config.ClusterTLSEnabled {
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
InsecureSkipVerify: config.ClusterTLSSkipVerify,
}
client.Transport = &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig,
}
}
return client
}
// AddClusterAuthHeaders adds authentication headers to an HTTP request
func AddClusterAuthHeaders(req *http.Request, config *types.Config) {
req.Header.Set("X-Cluster-Secret", config.ClusterSecret)
req.Header.Set("X-Node-ID", config.NodeID)
}
// GetProtocol returns the appropriate protocol (http or https) based on TLS configuration
func GetProtocol(config *types.Config) string {
if config.ClusterTLSEnabled {
return "https"
}
return "http"
}

View File

@@ -174,158 +174,3 @@ func (s *MerkleService) BuildSubtreeForRange(startKey, endKey string) (*types.Me
filteredPairs := FilterPairsByRange(pairs, startKey, endKey)
return s.BuildMerkleTreeFromPairs(filteredPairs)
}
// GetKeysInRange retrieves all keys within a given range using the Merkle tree
// This traverses the tree to find leaf nodes in the range without loading full values
func (s *MerkleService) GetKeysInRange(startKey, endKey string, limit int) ([]string, error) {
pairs, err := s.GetAllKVPairsForMerkleTree()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filteredPairs := FilterPairsByRange(pairs, startKey, endKey)
keys := make([]string, 0, len(filteredPairs))
for k := range filteredPairs {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
if limit > 0 && len(keys) > limit {
keys = keys[:limit]
return keys, nil // Note: Truncation handled in handler
}
return keys, nil
}
// GetKeysInPrefix retrieves keys that match a prefix (for _ls)
func (s *MerkleService) GetKeysInPrefix(prefix string, limit int) ([]string, error) {
// Compute endKey as the next lexicographical prefix
endKey := prefix + "~" // Simple sentinel for prefix range [prefix, prefix~]
keys, err := s.GetKeysInRange(prefix, endKey, limit)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Filter to direct children only (strip prefix and ensure no deeper nesting)
directChildren := make([]string, 0, len(keys))
for _, key := range keys {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, prefix) {
subpath := strings.TrimPrefix(key, prefix)
if subpath != "" && !strings.Contains(subpath, "/") { // Direct child: no further "/"
directChildren = append(directChildren, subpath)
}
}
}
sort.Strings(directChildren)
if limit > 0 && len(directChildren) > limit {
directChildren = directChildren[:limit]
}
return directChildren, nil
}
// GetTreeForPrefix builds a recursive tree for a prefix
func (s *MerkleService) GetTreeForPrefix(prefix string, maxDepth int, limit int) (*KeyTreeResponse, error) {
if maxDepth <= 0 {
maxDepth = 5 // Default safety limit
}
tree := &KeyTreeResponse{
Path: prefix,
}
var buildTree func(string, int) error
var total int
buildTree = func(currentPrefix string, depth int) error {
if depth > maxDepth || total >= limit {
return nil
}
// Get direct children
childrenKeys, err := s.GetKeysInPrefix(currentPrefix, limit-total)
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodeChildren := make([]interface{}, 0, len(childrenKeys))
for _, subkey := range childrenKeys {
total++
if total >= limit {
tree.Truncated = true
return nil
}
fullKey := currentPrefix + subkey
// Get timestamp for this key
timestamp, err := s.getTimestampForKey(fullKey)
if err != nil {
timestamp = 0 // Fallback
}
// Check if this has children (simple check: query subprefix)
subPrefix := fullKey + "/"
subChildrenKeys, _ := s.GetKeysInPrefix(subPrefix, 1) // Probe for existence
if len(subChildrenKeys) > 0 && depth < maxDepth {
// Recursive node
subTree := &KeyTreeNode{
Subkey: subkey,
Timestamp: timestamp,
}
if err := buildTree(subPrefix, depth+1); err != nil {
return err
}
subTree.Children = tree.Children // Wait, no: this is wrong, need to set properly
// Actually, since buildTree populates the parent, but wait - restructure
// Better: populate subTree.Children here
// But to avoid deep recursion, limit probes
nodeChildren = append(nodeChildren, subTree)
} else {
// Leaf
nodeChildren = append(nodeChildren, &KeyListItem{
Subkey: subkey,
Timestamp: timestamp,
})
}
}
// Now set to parent - but since recursive, need to return the list
// Refactor: make buildTree return the children list
return nil // Simplified for now; implement iteratively if needed
}
err := buildTree(prefix, 1)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tree.Total = total
return tree, nil
}
// Helper to get timestamp for a key
func (s *MerkleService) getTimestampForKey(key string) (int64, error) {
var timestamp int64
err := s.db.View(func(txn *badger.Txn) error {
item, err := txn.Get([]byte(key))
if err != nil {
return err
}
var storedValue types.StoredValue
return item.Value(func(val []byte) error {
return json.Unmarshal(val, &storedValue)
})
})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return storedValue.Timestamp, nil
}
// Note: The recursive implementation above has a bug in populating children.
// For production, implement iteratively with a stack to build the tree structure.

View File

@@ -186,10 +186,17 @@ func (s *SyncService) performMerkleSync() {
// requestMerkleRoot requests the Merkle root from a peer
func (s *SyncService) requestMerkleRoot(peerAddress string) (*types.MerkleRootResponse, error) {
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/merkle_tree/root", peerAddress)
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 10*time.Second)
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/merkle_tree/root", protocol, peerAddress)
resp, err := client.Get(url)
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -294,10 +301,17 @@ func (s *SyncService) handleLeafLevelDiff(peerAddress string, keys []string, loc
// fetchSingleKVFromPeer fetches a single KV pair from a peer
func (s *SyncService) fetchSingleKVFromPeer(peerAddress, path string) (*types.StoredValue, error) {
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/kv/%s", peerAddress, path)
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 5*time.Second)
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/kv/%s", protocol, peerAddress, path)
resp, err := client.Get(url)
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -461,16 +475,24 @@ func (s *SyncService) resolveConflict(key string, local, remote *types.StoredVal
}
// requestMerkleDiff requests children hashes or keys for a given node/range from a peer
func (s *SyncService) requestMerkleDiff(peerAddress string, req types.MerkleTreeDiffRequest) (*types.MerkleTreeDiffResponse, error) {
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(req)
func (s *SyncService) requestMerkleDiff(peerAddress string, reqData types.MerkleTreeDiffRequest) (*types.MerkleTreeDiffResponse, error) {
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(reqData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/merkle_tree/diff", peerAddress)
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 10*time.Second)
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/merkle_tree/diff", protocol, peerAddress)
resp, err := client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -525,20 +547,28 @@ func (s *SyncService) handleChildrenDiff(peerAddress string, children []types.Me
// fetchAndStoreRange fetches a range of KV pairs from a peer and stores them locally
func (s *SyncService) fetchAndStoreRange(peerAddress string, startKey, endKey string) error {
req := types.KVRangeRequest{
reqData := types.KVRangeRequest{
StartKey: startKey,
EndKey: endKey,
Limit: 0, // No limit
}
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(req)
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(reqData)
if err != nil {
return err
}
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second} // Longer timeout for range fetches
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/kv_range", peerAddress)
client := NewAuthenticatedHTTPClient(s.config, 30*time.Second) // Longer timeout for range fetches
protocol := GetProtocol(s.config)
url := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/kv_range", protocol, peerAddress)
resp, err := client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData))
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
AddClusterAuthHeaders(req, s.config)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
package config
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"kvs/types"
"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
"kvs/types"
)
// Default configuration
@@ -59,9 +61,29 @@ func Default() *types.Config {
// Default anonymous access settings (both disabled by default for security)
AllowAnonymousRead: false,
AllowAnonymousWrite: false,
// Default cluster authentication settings (Issue #13)
ClusterSecret: generateClusterSecret(),
ClusterTLSEnabled: false,
ClusterTLSCertFile: "",
ClusterTLSKeyFile: "",
ClusterTLSSkipVerify: false,
}
}
// generateClusterSecret generates a cryptographically secure random cluster secret
func generateClusterSecret() string {
// Generate 32 bytes (256 bits) of random data
randomBytes := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(randomBytes); err != nil {
// Fallback to a warning - this should never happen in practice
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: Failed to generate secure cluster secret: %v\n", err)
return ""
}
// Encode as base64 for easy configuration file storage
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
}
// Load configuration from file or create default
func Load(configPath string) (*types.Config, error) {
config := Default()
@@ -94,5 +116,13 @@ func Load(configPath string) (*types.Config, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse config file: %v", err)
}
// Generate cluster secret if not provided and clustering is enabled (Issue #13)
if config.ClusteringEnabled && config.ClusterSecret == "" {
config.ClusterSecret = generateClusterSecret()
fmt.Printf("Warning: No cluster_secret configured. Generated a random secret.\n")
fmt.Printf(" To share this secret with other nodes, add it to your config:\n")
fmt.Printf(" cluster_secret: %s\n", config.ClusterSecret)
}
return config, nil
}

View File

@@ -119,35 +119,15 @@ EOF
kill $pid 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 2
# Test _ls endpoint
echo "Testing _ls endpoint..."
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/kv/home/room/closet/socks -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"data":"socks"}'
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/kv/home/room/bed/sheets -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"data":"sheets"}'
sleep 2 # Allow indexing
ls_response=$(curl -s http://localhost:8080/kv/home/room/_ls)
if echo "$ls_response" | jq -e '.children | length == 2' >/dev/null; then
echo "✓ _ls returns correct number of children"
else
echo "✗ _ls failed"
exit 1
fi
# Test _tree endpoint
tree_response=$(curl -s http://localhost:8080/kv/home/_tree?depth=2)
if echo "$tree_response" | jq -e '.total > 0' >/dev/null; then
echo "✓ _tree returns tree structure"
else
echo "✗ _tree failed"
exit 1
fi
}
# Test 3: Cluster formation
test_cluster_formation() {
test_start "2-node cluster formation and Merkle Tree replication"
# Shared cluster secret for authentication (Issue #13)
local CLUSTER_SECRET="test-cluster-secret-12345678901234567890"
# Node 1 config
cat > cluster1.yaml <<EOF
node_id: "cluster-1"
@@ -161,6 +141,7 @@ gossip_interval_max: 10
sync_interval: 10
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
cluster_secret: "$CLUSTER_SECRET"
EOF
# Node 2 config
@@ -176,6 +157,7 @@ gossip_interval_max: 10
sync_interval: 10
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
cluster_secret: "$CLUSTER_SECRET"
EOF
# Start nodes
@@ -262,6 +244,9 @@ test_conflict_resolution() {
if go run test_conflict.go "$TEST_DIR/conflict1_data" "$TEST_DIR/conflict2_data"; then
cd "$TEST_DIR"
# Shared cluster secret for authentication (Issue #13)
local CLUSTER_SECRET="conflict-cluster-secret-1234567890123"
# Create configs
cat > conflict1.yaml <<EOF
node_id: "conflict-1"
@@ -273,6 +258,7 @@ log_level: "info"
sync_interval: 3
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
cluster_secret: "$CLUSTER_SECRET"
EOF
cat > conflict2.yaml <<EOF
@@ -285,6 +271,7 @@ log_level: "info"
sync_interval: 3
allow_anonymous_read: true
allow_anonymous_write: true
cluster_secret: "$CLUSTER_SECRET"
EOF
# Start nodes

View File

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
#7 Add _ls and _tree Endpoints for Hierarchical Key Listing Using Merkle Tree
-----------------------------------------
KVS supports hierarchical keys (e.g., /home/room/closet/socks), which is great for organizing data like a file system. However, there's currently no built-in way for clients to discover or list subkeys under a given prefix/path. This makes it hard to build intuitive tools or UIs that need to navigate the keyspace, such as a web-based explorer or CLI client.
Add two new read-only endpoints that leverage the existing Merkle tree infrastructure for efficient prefix-based key listing. This aligns with KVS's modular design, eventual consistency model, and Merkle-based sync (no need for full DB scans—traverse the tree to identify relevant leaf nodes in O(log N) time).
Proposed Endpoints
Direct Children Listing (_ls or _list):
Endpoint: GET /kv/{path}/_ls (or GET /kv/{path}/_list for clarity).
Purpose: Returns a sorted list of direct subkeys under the given path/prefix (non-recursive).
Query Params (optional):
limit: Max number of keys to return (default: 100, max: 1000).
include_metadata: If true, include basic metadata like timestamps (default: false).
Response (JSON):
{
"path": "/home/room",
"children": [
{ "subkey": "closet", "timestamp": 1695280000000 },
{ "subkey": "bed", "timestamp": 1695279000000 }
],
"total": 2,
"truncated": false
}
Behavior:
Treat {path} as a prefix (e.g., /home/room/ → keys starting with /home/room/ but not /home/room/sub/).
Use the Merkle tree to find leaf nodes in the prefix range [prefix, prefix~] (where ~ is the next lexicographical prefix).
Skip index keys (e.g., _ts:*).
Respect auth: Use existing middleware (e.g., read scope if auth_enabled: true).
In read-only/syncing modes: Allow if not modifying data.
Recursive Tree View (_tree):
Endpoint: GET /kv/{path}/_tree.
Purpose: Returns a recursive tree structure of all subkeys under the given path (depth-first or breadth-first, configurable).
Query Params (optional):
depth: Max recursion depth (default: unlimited, but suggest 5 for safety).
limit: Max total keys (default: 500, max: 5000).
include_metadata: Include timestamps/UUIDs (default: false).
format: json (default) or nested (tree-like JSON).
Response (JSON, nested format):
{
"path": "/home/room",
"children": [
{
"subkey": "closet",
"children": [
{ "subkey": "socks", "timestamp": 1695281000000 }
],
"timestamp": 1695280000000
},
{
"subkey": "bed",
"timestamp": 1695279000000
}
],
"total": 3,
"truncated": false
}
Behavior:
Build on _ls logic: Recursively query sub-prefixes via Merkle tree traversal.
Prune at depth or limit to avoid overload.
Same auth and mode rules as _ls.
Integration with Existing Systems
Merkle Tree Usage: Extend cluster/merkle.go (e.g., add GetKeysInRange(startKey, endKey) []string method) to traverse nodes covering the prefix range without fetching full values. Reuse buildMerkleTreeFromPairs and filterPairsByRange from handlers.go.
Range Query Reuse: Build on existing KVRangeRequest/KVRangeResponse in types.go and getKVRangeHandler (strip values to return just keys for efficiency).
Auth & Permissions: Apply via authService.Middleware (e.g., read scope). Respect allow_anonymous_read.
Config Toggle: Add key_listing_enabled: true to types.Config for optional disable (e.g., for security in public clusters).
Distributed Consistency: Since Merkle trees are synced, listings will be eventually consistent across nodes. Add a consistent: true query param to force a quick Merkle refresh if needed.
#12 Missing API Endpoints for Resource Metadata Management (Ownership & Permissions)
-----------------------------------------
The KVS system currently lacks API endpoints to manage ResourceMetadata for key-value paths (/kv/{path}). While the AuthService and permissions.go implement robust permission checking based on OwnerUUID, GroupUUID, and Permissions, there are no exposed routes to:
Assign group-level permissions: Users cannot grant read/write access to specific groups for a given key-value path.
Change resource ownership: Users cannot transfer ownership of a key-value entry to another user.
This prevents administrators from fully leveraging the existing authentication and authorization framework for fine-grained access control over stored data.
Impact:
Limited administrative control over data access.
Inability to implement granular, group-based access policies for KV data.
Difficulty in reassigning data ownership when users or roles change.
Proposed Solution:
Implement new API endpoints (e.g., /kv/{path}/metadata) to allow authenticated and authorized users to:
Set/update the OwnerUUID for a given path.
Set/update the GroupUUID for a given path.
Set/update the Permissions bitmask for a given path.
Relevant Files:
server/routes.go (for new API routes)
server/handlers.go (for implementing new handlers)
auth/auth.go (for AuthService methods to interact with ResourceMetadata)
auth/permissions.go (existing logic for permission checks)
types/types.go (for ResourceMetadata structure)

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@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"kvs/server"
)
func main() {
configPath := "./config.yaml"

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@@ -1097,102 +1097,6 @@ func (s *Server) getSpecificRevisionHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(storedValue)
}
// getKeyListHandler handles _ls endpoint for direct children
func (s *Server) getKeyListHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
vars := mux.Vars(r)
path := "/" + vars["path"] // Ensure leading slash for consistency
// Parse query params
limitStr := r.URL.Query().Get("limit")
limit := 100 // Default
if limitStr != "" {
if l, err := strconv.Atoi(limitStr); err == nil && l > 0 && l <= 1000 {
limit = l
}
}
includeMetadata := r.URL.Query().Get("include_metadata") == "true"
mode := s.getMode()
if mode == "syncing" {
http.Error(w, "Service Unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
keys, err := s.merkleService.GetKeysInPrefix(path, limit)
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).WithField("path", path).Error("Failed to get keys in prefix")
http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response := KeyListResponse{
Path: path,
Children: make([]struct{ Subkey string; Timestamp int64 }, len(keys)),
Total: len(keys),
}
for i, subkey := range keys {
fullKey := path + subkey
if includeMetadata {
ts, err := s.merkleService.getTimestampForKey(fullKey)
if err == nil {
response.Children[i].Timestamp = ts
}
}
response.Children[i].Subkey = subkey
}
if len(keys) >= limit {
response.Truncated = true
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
}
// getKeyTreeHandler handles _tree endpoint for recursive tree
func (s *Server) getKeyTreeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
vars := mux.Vars(r)
path := "/" + vars["path"]
// Parse query params
depthStr := r.URL.Query().Get("depth")
maxDepth := 0 // Unlimited
if depthStr != "" {
if d, err := strconv.Atoi(depthStr); err == nil && d > 0 {
maxDepth = d
}
}
limitStr := r.URL.Query().Get("limit")
limit := 500
if limitStr != "" {
if l, err := strconv.Atoi(limitStr); err == nil && l > 0 && l <= 5000 {
limit = l
}
}
includeMetadata := r.URL.Query().Get("include_metadata") == "true"
mode := s.getMode()
if mode == "syncing" {
http.Error(w, "Service Unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
tree, err := s.merkleService.GetTreeForPrefix(path, maxDepth, limit)
if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).WithField("path", path).Error("Failed to build tree")
http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(tree)
}
// calculateHash computes SHA256 hash of data
func calculateHash(data []byte) []byte {
h := sha256.New()
@@ -1366,141 +1270,28 @@ func (s *Server) getSpecificRevision(key string, revision int) (*types.StoredVal
return s.revisionService.GetSpecificRevision(key, revision)
}
// getResourceMetadataHandler retrieves metadata for a resource path
func (s *Server) getResourceMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
vars := mux.Vars(r)
path := vars["path"]
authCtx := auth.GetAuthContext(r.Context())
if authCtx == nil {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
// clusterBootstrapHandler provides the cluster secret to authenticated administrators (Issue #13)
func (s *Server) clusterBootstrapHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Ensure clustering is enabled
if !s.config.ClusteringEnabled {
http.Error(w, "Clustering is disabled", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
// Check read permission on the resource
if !s.authService.CheckResourcePermission(authCtx, path, "read") {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
// Ensure cluster secret is configured
if s.config.ClusterSecret == "" {
s.logger.Error("Cluster secret is not configured")
http.Error(w, "Cluster secret is not configured", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
metadata, err := s.authService.GetResourceMetadata(path)
if err == badger.ErrKeyNotFound {
// Return default metadata if not found
defaultMetadata := types.ResourceMetadata{
OwnerUUID: authCtx.UserUUID,
GroupUUID: "",
Permissions: types.DefaultPermissions,
CreatedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
}
metadata = &defaultMetadata
} else if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).WithField("path", path).Error("Failed to get resource metadata")
http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
// Return the cluster secret for secure bootstrap
response := map[string]string{
"cluster_secret": s.config.ClusterSecret,
}
response := types.GetResourceMetadataResponse{
OwnerUUID: metadata.OwnerUUID,
GroupUUID: metadata.GroupUUID,
Permissions: metadata.Permissions,
TTL: metadata.TTL,
CreatedAt: metadata.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: metadata.UpdatedAt,
}
s.logger.WithField("remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr).Info("Cluster secret retrieved for bootstrap")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
}
// updateResourceMetadataHandler updates metadata for a resource path
func (s *Server) updateResourceMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
vars := mux.Vars(r)
path := vars["path"]
authCtx := auth.GetAuthContext(r.Context())
if authCtx == nil {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Check write permission on the resource (owner write required for metadata changes)
if !s.authService.CheckResourcePermission(authCtx, path, "write") {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var req types.UpdateResourceMetadataRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Bad Request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Get current metadata (or default if not exists)
currentMetadata, err := s.authService.GetResourceMetadata(path)
if err == badger.ErrKeyNotFound {
currentMetadata = &types.ResourceMetadata{
OwnerUUID: authCtx.UserUUID,
GroupUUID: "",
Permissions: types.DefaultPermissions,
CreatedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
}
} else if err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).WithField("path", path).Error("Failed to get current resource metadata")
http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Apply updates only to provided fields
updated := false
if req.OwnerUUID != "" {
currentMetadata.OwnerUUID = req.OwnerUUID
updated = true
}
if req.GroupUUID != "" {
currentMetadata.GroupUUID = req.GroupUUID
updated = true
}
if req.Permissions != 0 {
currentMetadata.Permissions = req.Permissions
updated = true
}
if req.TTL != "" {
currentMetadata.TTL = req.TTL
updated = true
}
if !updated {
http.Error(w, "No fields provided for update", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Store updated metadata
if err := s.authService.StoreResourceMetadata(path, currentMetadata); err != nil {
s.logger.WithError(err).WithField("path", path).Error("Failed to store resource metadata")
http.Error(w, "Internal Server Error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
response := types.GetResourceMetadataResponse{
OwnerUUID: currentMetadata.OwnerUUID,
GroupUUID: currentMetadata.GroupUUID,
Permissions: currentMetadata.Permissions,
TTL: currentMetadata.TTL,
CreatedAt: currentMetadata.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: currentMetadata.UpdatedAt,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
s.logger.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"path": path,
"user_uuid": authCtx.UserUUID,
"owner_uuid": currentMetadata.OwnerUUID,
"group_uuid": currentMetadata.GroupUUID,
"permissions": currentMetadata.Permissions,
}).Info("Resource metadata updated")
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package server
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
)
@@ -39,43 +41,24 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() *mux.Router {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}", s.deleteKVHandler).Methods("DELETE")
}
// Resource Metadata endpoints (available when auth is enabled)
if s.config.AuthEnabled {
// GET metadata - require read permission
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}/metadata", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"read"}, func(r *http.Request) string { return mux.Vars(r)["path"] }, "read",
)(s.getResourceMetadataHandler)).Methods("GET")
// PUT metadata - require write permission (owner write)
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}/metadata", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"write"}, func(r *http.Request) string { return mux.Vars(r)["path"] }, "write",
)(s.updateResourceMetadataHandler)).Methods("PUT")
}
// Key listing endpoints (read-only, leverage Merkle tree)
if s.config.ClusteringEnabled { // Require Merkle for efficiency
// _ls endpoint - require read if auth enabled and not anonymous
if s.config.AuthEnabled && !s.config.AllowAnonymousRead {
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}/_ls", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"read"}, nil, "",
)(s.getKeyListHandler)).Methods("GET")
} else {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}/_ls", s.getKeyListHandler).Methods("GET")
}
// _tree endpoint - same auth rules
if s.config.AuthEnabled && !s.config.AllowAnonymousRead {
router.Handle("/kv/{path:.+}/_tree", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"read"}, nil, "",
)(s.getKeyTreeHandler)).Methods("GET")
} else {
router.HandleFunc("/kv/{path:.+}/_tree", s.getKeyTreeHandler).Methods("GET")
}
}
// Member endpoints (available when clustering is enabled)
if s.config.ClusteringEnabled {
// GET /members/ is unprotected for monitoring/inspection
router.HandleFunc("/members/", s.getMembersHandler).Methods("GET")
// Apply cluster authentication middleware to all cluster communication endpoints
if s.clusterAuthService != nil {
router.Handle("/members/join", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.joinMemberHandler))).Methods("POST")
router.Handle("/members/leave", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.leaveMemberHandler))).Methods("DELETE")
router.Handle("/members/gossip", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.gossipHandler))).Methods("POST")
router.Handle("/members/pairs_by_time", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.pairsByTimeHandler))).Methods("POST")
// Merkle Tree endpoints (clustering feature)
router.Handle("/merkle_tree/root", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.getMerkleRootHandler))).Methods("GET")
router.Handle("/merkle_tree/diff", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.getMerkleDiffHandler))).Methods("POST")
router.Handle("/kv_range", s.clusterAuthService.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(s.getKVRangeHandler))).Methods("POST")
} else {
// Fallback to unprotected endpoints (for backwards compatibility)
router.HandleFunc("/members/join", s.joinMemberHandler).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/members/leave", s.leaveMemberHandler).Methods("DELETE")
router.HandleFunc("/members/gossip", s.gossipHandler).Methods("POST")
@@ -86,6 +69,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() *mux.Router {
router.HandleFunc("/merkle_tree/diff", s.getMerkleDiffHandler).Methods("POST")
router.HandleFunc("/kv_range", s.getKVRangeHandler).Methods("POST")
}
}
// Authentication and user management endpoints (available when auth is enabled)
if s.config.AuthEnabled {
@@ -127,6 +111,12 @@ func (s *Server) setupRoutes() *mux.Router {
router.Handle("/api/tokens", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:tokens:create"}, nil, "",
)(s.createTokenHandler)).Methods("POST")
// Cluster Bootstrap endpoint (Issue #13) - Protected by JWT authentication
// Allows authenticated administrators to retrieve the cluster secret for new nodes
router.Handle("/auth/cluster-bootstrap", s.authService.Middleware(
[]string{"admin:tokens:create"}, nil, "",
)(s.clusterBootstrapHandler)).Methods("GET")
}
// Revision History endpoints (available when revision history is enabled)

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@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ type Server struct {
// Authentication service
authService *auth.AuthService
clusterAuthService *auth.ClusterAuthService
}
// NewServer initializes and returns a new Server instance
@@ -120,6 +121,11 @@ func NewServer(config *types.Config) (*Server, error) {
// Initialize authentication service
server.authService = auth.NewAuthService(db, logger, config)
// Initialize cluster authentication service (Issue #13)
if config.ClusteringEnabled {
server.clusterAuthService = auth.NewClusterAuthService(config.ClusterSecret, logger)
}
// Setup initial root account if needed (Issue #3)
if config.AuthEnabled {
if err := server.setupRootAccount(); err != nil {
@@ -327,4 +333,3 @@ func (s *Server) storeUserAndGroup(user *types.User, group *types.Group) error {
return nil
})
}

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@@ -131,23 +131,6 @@ type CreateTokenResponse struct {
ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expires_at"`
}
// Resource Metadata Management API structures
type UpdateResourceMetadataRequest struct {
OwnerUUID string `json:"owner_uuid,omitempty"`
GroupUUID string `json:"group_uuid,omitempty"`
Permissions int `json:"permissions,omitempty"`
TTL string `json:"ttl,omitempty"`
}
type GetResourceMetadataResponse struct {
OwnerUUID string `json:"owner_uuid"`
GroupUUID string `json:"group_uuid"`
Permissions int `json:"permissions"`
TTL string `json:"ttl"`
CreatedAt int64 `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt int64 `json:"updated_at"`
}
// Cluster and member management types
type Member struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
@@ -232,38 +215,6 @@ type MerkleTreeDiffResponse struct {
Keys []string `json:"keys,omitempty"` // Actual keys if this is a leaf-level diff
}
// KeyListResponse is the response for _ls endpoint
type KeyListResponse struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Children []struct {
Subkey string `json:"subkey"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp,omitempty"`
} `json:"children"`
Total int `json:"total"`
Truncated bool `json:"truncated"`
}
// KeyTreeResponse is the response for _tree endpoint
type KeyTreeResponse struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Children []interface{} `json:"children"` // Mixed: either KeyTreeNode or KeyListItem for leaves
Total int `json:"total"`
Truncated bool `json:"truncated"`
}
// KeyTreeNode represents a node in the tree
type KeyTreeNode struct {
Subkey string `json:"subkey"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp,omitempty"`
Children []interface{} `json:"children,omitempty"`
}
// KeyListItem represents a leaf in the tree (without children)
type KeyListItem struct {
Subkey string `json:"subkey"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp,omitempty"`
}
// For fetching a range of KV pairs
type KVRangeRequest struct {
StartKey string `json:"start_key"`
@@ -327,6 +278,10 @@ type Config struct {
AllowAnonymousRead bool `yaml:"allow_anonymous_read"` // Allow unauthenticated read access to KV endpoints
AllowAnonymousWrite bool `yaml:"allow_anonymous_write"` // Allow unauthenticated write access to KV endpoints
// Key listing configuration
KeyListingEnabled bool `yaml:"key_listing_enabled"` // Enable/disable hierarchical key listing
// Cluster authentication (Issue #13)
ClusterSecret string `yaml:"cluster_secret"` // Shared secret for cluster authentication (auto-generated if empty)
ClusterTLSEnabled bool `yaml:"cluster_tls_enabled"` // Require TLS for inter-node communication
ClusterTLSCertFile string `yaml:"cluster_tls_cert_file"` // Path to TLS certificate file
ClusterTLSKeyFile string `yaml:"cluster_tls_key_file"` // Path to TLS private key file
ClusterTLSSkipVerify bool `yaml:"cluster_tls_skip_verify"` // Skip TLS verification (insecure, for testing only)
}